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Nous utilisons les données de la US Survey of Consumer Finances (Enquête sur les finances des
consommateurs, aux États-Unis) afin d’évaluer l’impact sur les recettes fiscales d’une éventuelle annulation
de la disposition fiscale qui permet de déduire des revenus imposables les intérêts hypothécaires aux États-
Unis. Nous soutenons que l’élimination de cette disposition forcerait les ménages à remanier leur bilan,
étant donné qu’ils devraient payer plus d’impôt sur les revenus d’intérêt. Nous montrons que le coût de cette
disposition fiscale équivaut à une somme allant de 36 % à 66 % des évaluations que fait l’US Office of
Management and Budget (l’équivalent américain du Conseil du Trésor canadien), selon les hypothèses que
l’on fait au sujet des types d’actifs que les ménages utiliseraient pour réduire leur dette hypothécaire à la
suite de l’annulation de la disposition. En outre, comme ce sont surtout les ménages les plus aisés qui
pourraient alors remanier leur bilan, nous constatons que les effets distributifs de cette disposition fiscale
sont beaucoup moins importants qu’on ne le croit habituellement. Même si cette étude concerne
principalement l’impact de l’élimination de la disposition fiscale qui permet de déduire des revenus
imposables les intérêts hypothécaires aux États-Unis, nos résultats permettent d’évaluer non seulement
l’impact sur les recettes fiscales fédérales canadiennes mais aussi les effets redistributifs que pourraient
avoir une éventuelle introduction de cette disposition fiscale au Canada.
Mots clés : déductibilité des intérêts hypothécaires, logement, fiscalité, redistribution
We use the US Survey of Consumer Finances to measure the change in federal tax liability that would result
should mortgage interest no longer be deductible from taxable income. We argue that the elimination of this
housing tax provision would lead households to reshuffle their balance sheet, thereby lowering the amount
of interest income taxes collected. We find that the cost of this tax provision is between 36 and 66 percent of
the estimates produced by the US Office of Management and Budget, depending on the types of assets one
assumes would be used to lower mortgage debt following the removal of the provision. Furthermore, since
mostly rich households would be in a position to reshuffle their balance sheet following such a change in
tax policy, the distributional effects of this program are much smaller than conventionally believed. While
the focus of this paper is on the elimination of mortage interest deductibility in the US, the results of this
study shed some light on the impact and distributional consequences to expect should mortgage interest
deductibility be introduced in Canada.
Keywords: mortgage interest deductibility, housing, taxation, redistribution
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INTRODUCTION
The fact that owner-occupied housing capital re-ceives a preferential tax treatment is well
known. One such tax provision which receives a lot
of attention, either because of its presence or ab-
sence from the tax code, is the deductibility of
mortgage interest payments from taxable income.1
There are at least two reasons why mortgage inter-
est deductibility (MID) draws such interest from
academics and policy-makers alike. One is that this
tax provision is perceived to be very costly for the
government. The US Office of Management and
Budget (OMB) estimates that mortgage interest
deductibility will cost the government over $74 bil-
lion of revenue losses in 2006, which represents
around 7.5 percent of total individual income tax
revenues as projected by the US Congressional
Budget Office (CBO). Second, mortgage interest
deductibility is widely perceived to benefit relatively
wealthy households at the expense of less fortunate
ones (e.g., see Maki 1996). Not surprisingly, the
elimination of this tax provision periodically sur-
faces in policy debates in the US (for a recent
example, see Bourassa and Grigsby 2000). In this
paper, we argue that both the cost and re-distribu-
tional effects of mortgage interest deductibility are
greatly overstated for the US. Although our study
mainly focuses on the US, our results provide some
insights for the debate in Canada where full or par-
tial mortgage interest deductibility has been debated
on several occasions over the years—the most re-
cent example being the 2003 provincial election
campaign in Ontario, during which the Progressive
Conservative Party proposed to phase in deduction
of mortgage payments from provincial income
taxes.2
The conventional belief that mortgage interest
deductibility is regressive stems from the fact that
home-ownership rates differ considerably across
groups of different status (e.g., Poterba 1990). Using
data from the 1998 US Survey of Consumer Fi-
nances (SCF), Figures 1 and 2 show that indeed the
home-ownership rate (grey line) increases with in-
come and, to a lesser extent, with wealth. These
figures also show that the fraction of households
with mortgage debt (black line) is higher for house-
holds with relatively high income or wealth,
although this fraction levels off in both cases. A
similar picture emerges from households who item-
ize deductions.3  Glaeser and Shapiro (2003) report
that the fraction of itemizers in the top income decile
(31 percent) is about eight times higher than the frac-
tion of itemizers in the fifth decile of the distribution
(4 percent). At first glance these figures lend some
support to the conventional view that mortgage in-
terest deductibili ty mainly benefits wealthy
households, as they are more likely than poor house-
holds to be homeowners and have outstanding
mortgage debt.
The central idea of this paper is that households
would alter their balance sheet if mortgage interest
were no longer deductible.4  Hence, knowledge of
households’ entire balance sheet is necessary to
estimate the cost and re-distributional effects of this
tax provision so that, in and of themselves, figures
1 and 2 paint an inaccurate picture of the cost and
distributional effects of mortgage interest
deductibility.
Along similar veins, Follain and Melamed (1998)
use one of Follain and Dunsky’s (1997) estimates
for the elasticity of the demand for mortgage with
respect to marginal tax rates, itself obtained through
a reduced-form regression from a cross-section of
households, and compute the cost of mortgage in-
terest deductibility. They also argue that the figures
published by the OMB overstate the amount of
government revenue losses due to MID.5  Instead
of relying on previously estimated elasticities, we
use households’ actual balance sheet from SCF data
and speculate as to which assets households would
use to reshuffle their balance sheet should mortgage
interest no longer be deductible. The idea, of course,
is that since the revenues generated by these assets
are taxable under current US tax law, these revenues
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FIGURE 1
Home Ownership and Mortgage Incidence by Income
Source: Authors’ calculations using US SCF 1998 data.
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FIGURE 2
Home Ownership and Mortgage Incidence by Wealth
Source: Authors’ calculations using US SCF 1998 data.
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should be deducted from the cost of running the pro-
gram. In addition to its simplicity, our approach is
transparent in the sense that it follows directly from
a standard specification of households’ budget con-
straints. Moreover, an equivalent approach using
flows rather than stocks can easily be implemented
by the US Internal Revenue Service (IRS) from tax
return data, thereby offering a simple way to esti-
mate revenue losses due to MID.
To gain some confidence in the data available in
the SCF, we first undertake the calculation of the
cost of mortgage interest deductibility using the sim-
ple method used by the OMB, which is given by the
difference between total federal tax liability with
and without the tax provision. To do so, we com-
pute the tax liability for each household in the SCF
using the NBER TaxSim model (for fiscal year 1997)
with and without the deduction.6  Our estimate of
the cost of mortgage interest deductibility for 1997
is around $52 billion, which is less than 2 percent
lower than the $53 billion figure reported by the
OMB for fiscal year 1997.7  As a by-product, TaxSim
reports an estimate of each household’s marginal tax
rate at the federal level. Using these marginal tax
rates together with each household’s reported mort-
gage interest payment in the SCF, we can obtain
another measure of the cost of MID simply by add-
ing up each household’s cost. This simple measure, at
$50 billion, is sufficiently close to the IRS number to
conclude that changes in marginal tax rates, which are
ignored by this latter measure, are of second order.
A better measure of the cost of MID would take
into account the fact that households would use some
of their assets to pay off their mortgage debt should
mortgage interest no longer be deductible.8  Since
the government would lose the taxes collected on
the interest generated by these assets, these taxes
can be thought of as tax revenues made possible by
mortgage interest deductibility. As such, this tax
revenue should be deducted from the conventional
(OMB) cost of this tax provision. We propose three
such measures. Our first measure assumes that all
non-pension wealth would be used to pay off mort-
gage debt if MID were eliminated. The cost of the
program under this measure is under $20 billion,
which is less than 40 percent of the conventional
measure. Under a more conservative measure, which
assumes that only taxable financial assets other than
liquid assets would be used to offset mortgage debt,
the cost is still less than 66 percent of the conven-
tional measure. Our preferred measure, which
excludes all assets whose return may be either un-
taxed or tax-deferred, is around 60 percent of the
OMB figure. In addition, it is interesting to note that
the elasticity of mortgage demand estimated by
Dunsky and Follain (2000) lies in the range of the
elasticities implied by our proposed measures.
We also characterize who benefits from mortgage
interest deductibility. As one would expect, our
measures show significantly less of the benefits of
this program going to wealthy households than the
conventional measure: they are the households best
equipped to pay off their mortgage once the tax ad-
vantage is removed. Contrary to the conventional
measure, for which the benefits from MID increase
with wealth, our preferred measure suggests that
MID does not benefit richer households any more
than the median wealth household. We also show
that while the benefits of mortgage interest
deductibility increase with income, they do not in-
crease as fast as taxes paid at relatively high income
levels.  We thus find that mortgage interest
deductibility makes the tax code less progressive at
relatively low levels of income and more progres-
sive at relatively high levels of income. We also
show that mortgage interest deductibility is particu-
larly important for new home buyers, a pattern that
does not emerge with the conventional measure.
Finally, we use Canadian data to gain further confi-
dence in our measures of the cost and distributional
effects of removing mortgage interest deductibility.
We find that without MID, the US distribution of
mortgage incidence by income and wealth and the
asset holding patterns by age implied by our pro-
posed measures are very similar to those in Canada.
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One aspect that we do not consider in this paper
is that in addition to reshuffling their balance sheet,
households could also change their housing tenure
choice following the removal of mortgage interest
deductibility. However, simulation results in Gervais
(2002) imply that mortgage interest deductibility is
relatively unimportant for the tenure decision: the
home-ownership rate is only four percentage points
higher in an economy with mortgage interest
deductibility relative to an economy without the
deduction.9  Consistent with our results, mortgage
interest deductibility is relatively important for new
homeowners, who purchase their first house at a
younger age when mortgage interest payments are
deductible. Similarly, Glaeser and Shapiro (2003)
argue that mortgage interest deductibility is unlikely
to have much of an impact on the home-ownership
rate, and conclude that it is a poor instrument if the
goal of the program is to increase the home-owner-
ship rate.10
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. The
next section discusses the reasons why measuring
the cost of mortgage interest deductibility, or for
that matter measuring any tax expenditure, is a dif-
ficult task. Our measures of the cost of mortgage
interest deductibility are presented in the third sec-
tion, and distributional effects are discussed in the
following section. In the fifth section we present
indirect evidence in favour of our measures by us-
ing data from Canada, where mortgage interest
payments are not deductible. Concluding remarks
are offered in the final section.
MORTGAGE INTEREST DEDUCTIBILITY:
A TAX EXPENDITURE
The US Congressional Budget Act of 1974 defines
tax expenditures as “revenue losses attributable to
provisions of the Federal tax laws which allow a
special exclusion, exemption, or deduction from
gross income or which provide a special credit, a
preferential rate of tax, or a deferral of tax liabil-
ity.” The Budget Act also requires that a list of tax
expenditures be included in the annual budget. As
Table 1 shows, mortgage interest deductibility was
the second-most important tax expenditure as re-
ported by the US Office of Management and Budget
for 2006.
Although the Budget Act requires disclosure of
tax expenditures, it offers little guidance as to how
to measure tax expenditures. Broadly speaking, tax
TABLE 1
Income Tax Expenditures, 2006
Rank Provision Cost ($m)
1 Exclusion of employer contributions for medical insurance premiums and medical care 144,710
2 Deductibility of mortgage interest on owner-occupied homes 74,790
3 Net exclusion of pension contributions and earnings: employer plans 73,200
4 Net exclusion of pension contributions and earnings: 401(k) plans 61,490
5 Capital gains (except agriculture, timber, iron ore, and coal) 49,870
Source: US Office of Management and Budget (2005).
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expenditures are measured as the difference between
the tax liability under present law and the tax liabil-
ity that would result from a re-computation of the
tax liability without benefit of the tax provision.
There are obvious issues in measuring any tax ex-
penditure.11  Two such issues are particularly
important for mortgage interest deductibility. First,
the concept of tax expenditure relies on the exist-
ence of a “normal” tax code, one that does not have
such a provision. For instance, if we defined a nor-
mal tax system as one where the implicit revenue
from owner-occupied housing (imputed rents) is
taxed, then mortgage interest deductibility no longer
constitutes a tax expenditure, as long as one accepts
that interest on loans acquired to generate a revenue
should be deductible against that revenue. Although
this issue is of obvious importance, it is not the sub-
ject of this paper.12
A second issue is that strong assumptions on be-
haviour need to be made in order to measure tax
expenditures. In particular, the numbers published
by the OMB assume that individual behaviour re-
mains unchanged once a tax provision is removed.
In this paper, we argue that plausible changes in
behaviour upon the elimination of mortgage inter-
est deductibility paint a very different picture from
that suggested by Table 1.
Our argument is very simple since mortgage debt
can be used, explicitly or implicitly, to purchase non-
housing assets which generate taxable income,
households would reshuffle their balance sheet us-
ing these assets to pay off (at least part of) their
mortgage debt upon the removal of mortgage inter-
est deductibility. In other words, the income
generated by these assets reduces the cost of allow-
ing mortgage interest deductibility.
As an example, consider two households with
balance sheets given in Table 2. In standard mod-
els, in which the borrowing and lending rates are
equal, households are indifferent between either of
these balance sheets as long as mortgage interest
payments are deductible. However, these two bal-
ance sheets would lead to very different costs of
MID using the OMB measure. This is because
household A has an outstanding mortgage of
$50,000, which, at an interest rate of 10 percent and
a tax rate of 20 percent appears to cost the govern-
ment $1,000 of tax revenues. Of course, this
calculation omits the fact that this mortgage debt is
implicitly used to hold $50,000 worth of non-
residential assets generating $5,000 of revenues
which, if also taxed at 20 percent, completely off-
sets the mortgage deduction. Put differently,
household A would sell off $50,000 worth of non-
TABLE 2
Balance Sheets for Household A and Household B
Balance Sheet A Balance Sheet B
House Mrtg debt House Mrtg debt
h = 200,000 b = 50,000 h = 200,000 b = 0
Non-res assets Non-res assets
a = 100,000 a = 50,000
Net worth Net worth
y = 250,000 y = 250,000
Source: Authors’ compilation.
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residential assets if mortgage interest payments were
no longer deductible.
In what follows we formalize this idea by com-
puting the cost of mortgage interest deductibility,
still in terms of government revenue losses, under
different assumptions regarding the type of assets
that individuals would use to lower their mortgage
debt if the provision were eliminated.
MEASURING THE COST OF MORTGAGE
INTEREST DEDUCTIBILITY
In this section we evaluate the amount of revenue
the US government foregoes by allowing homeown-
ers to deduct mortgage interest payments from
taxable income. We compute four different measures
of the revenue loss for the government. Our first
measure, which we refer to as the conventional
measure, is based on the calculations undertaken by
the OMB to measure various tax expenditures. Ac-
cordingly, this measure assumes that households
would not respond in any way following the removal
of mortgage interest deductibility. Clearly, this
measure constitutes an upper bound for the cost of
MID, as one would expect households to alter their
balance sheet to reduce their outstanding mortgage
debt. Hence, we propose three measures that differ
in their assumptions about how households would
adjust their balance sheets to reduce their outstand-
ing mortgage debt following the removal of
mortgage interest deductibility. All three measures
are computed under the assumption that households
face the same exogenously given interest rate on bor-
rowing and lending.13  For all measures, marginal
income tax rates are household specific and are cal-
culated using the TaxSim model.14  Of course, all
calculations are for households that itemize their de-
duction, as the revenue loss to the government for
non-itemizing households is zero.15  However, our
measures do take into account the fact that some
households may no longer choose to itemize their
deductions once mortgage interest deductibility is
removed.
To fix ideas, consider an age-j household (indexed k)
whose current net wealth, denoted y j
k
, is composed
of housing asset h j
k
, of which b hj
k
j
k<  is mort-
gaged, and net non-housing assets worth a j
k
, so that
y a h bj
k
j
k
j
k
j
k
= + − . The budget constraint of this
household is given by
c px y w i a i h
i b w ia ib
j
k
j
k
j
k
j
k
j
k h
j
k
j
k
j
k
j
k
j
k
j
k
+ + = + + + +
− + − + −
+1 1 1
1
( ) ( )
( ) ( )τ (1)
where c j
k
 is consumption; px j
k
 is the value of hous-
ing services consumed; w j
k
 is wage income, i is the
common lending and borrowing interest rate, and
i h  is the implicit interest income on owner-occupied
housing capital (imputed rents).16  The last term of
this budget constraint corresponds to a tax code in
which mortgage interest payments are fully deduct-
ible from taxable income—composed of interest and
labour income—which is taxed at rate τ j
k
.
Notice that both balance sheets in Table 2 would
produce identical budget constraints according to
equation (1). It is also interesting to note that since
the US IRS necessarily collects data on both inter-
est income (ia) and mortgage interest payments (ib),
it could easily compute the amount of mortgage in-
terest that is offset by interest income. The approach
we develop below, which is based on the balance
sheet rather than the flow of income, is equivalent
to this flow approach under the assumption of a com-
mon borrowing and lending interest rate.17  We use
a balance sheet approach since assets and liabilities
are better measured in SCF data than interest
income.
Conventional Measure
The conventional measure of the revenue loss to the
government is the difference between the total
amount of taxes that would be collected without al-
lowing for MID and total taxes collected with MID.
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This is indeed how the OMB arrives at the conclu-
sion that government revenue loss due to MID was
around $53.08 billion in 1997. Using our sample
from the SCF for 1998 (tax year 1997), we use
TaxSim to compute total tax liabilities with and
without MID. Doing so, our conventional measure
of the revenue loss due to MID is $52.13 billion,
which is very close to the revenue loss reported by
the OMB.18
Notice that if households’ marginal tax rates were
unaffected by this change in the tax code, then we
could compute the conventional measure simply by
adding up each household’s deduction, times their
marginal tax rate:
C i bk k
k
= × ×( )∑τ , (2)
where i b k×( )  is taken from the SCF and τ k  is
TaxSim’s estimate of household k’s marginal fed-
eral tax rate.19  Doing so results in a cost of $50.03
billion, which is very close to the $52.13 billion fig-
ure we obtained above. We conclude that changes
in marginal tax rates are of second order and as-
sume for our three measures below that marginal
tax rates remain constant following the removal of
MID.
Alternative Measures
Our approach is based on households’ balance sheet.
Under full mortgage interest deductibility, the
budget constraint (1) can be written as
c px y w y
i h i a b
j
k
j
k
j
k
j
k
j
k
j
k
h
j
k
j
k
j
k
j
k
+ + = − +
+ + − −
+1 1
1
( )
( ) ( )
τ
τ .
(3)
The last term in (3) implies that households are in-
different between many different balance sheets: as
long as the same interest rate applies to borrowing
and savings, households only care about non-
housing assets net of mortgage debt, as opposed to
the exact composition of their balance sheet. Fur-
thermore, if we assume that revenues from all as-
sets are taxed at the same rate, government revenues
are also unaffected by the composition of assets and
liabilities.
More precisely, the argument is that if household
k’s net worth is large enough for this household to
own its house outright ( y hk k>  or equivalently if
a bk k> ), then the entire mortgage is implicitly used
to finance other assets. Since these assets generate
income iak  which is taxed at rate τ k , the OMB
overstates the cost of MID by τ k ki b× × , as this
household’s assets generate taxable revenues that
exactly offset its mortgage deduction. Similarly, if
a household’s net worth is insufficient to own its
house outright ( a bk k< ), then the miscalculation
consists of the revenues on non-housing assets held
by the household, that is, τ k ki a× × . The aggre-
gate miscalculation, then, is given by
∆ = × × + × ×
≥ <
∑ ∑τ τk k
k a b
k k
k a b
i b i a
k k k k{ } { }
, (4)
and government revenue losses are given by
C i b ak k k
k a bk k
*
.= × × −( )
<
∑ τ
{ } (5)
Ideally, one would like to know the exact amount
of revenues generated by each component of house-
holds’ balance sheet. Unfortunately, the SCF does
not provide such information.20  Instead, we specify
a set of assets which we assume generate interest
income at a common interest rate i, while all other
assets are assumed to generate tax-free revenues.
Only the former assets are included when we com-
pute our measure of government revenue losses C*
in (5), as only these assets would be used to lower
mortgage debt if the deduction were eliminated.21
Our three measures below differ as to which assets
fall  into each category. To implement these
measures, we set the interest rate such that govern-
ment revenue losses in equation (2) under that common
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interest rate are equal to the conventional measure of
the revenue loss computed above ($50.03 billion). The
interest rate works out to be 7.29 percent.
Table 3 shows the components of the balance
sheet that we construct for each household in SCF,
along with the elements of our most comprehensive
measure of interest-bearing assets. For this inclu-
sive measure, we define interest-bearing asset ( ak )
as all (net) non-housing assets other than vehicles
and assets accumulated for retirement purposes
(such as 401k and thrift accounts).22  We think of
this measure as a lower bound on the revenue loss
to the government from providing taxpayers with
mortgage interest deductibility as it assumes that the
vast majority of assets acquired through mortgage
debt generate taxable income and would be used to
lower mortgage debt if MID were eliminated.
Our second definition of interest-bearing assets
only includes non-liquid, taxable financial assets
(excluding financial assets accumulated for retire-
ment) plus net non-residential real estate assets and
other (net) non-financial assets (see Table 3). This
measure, our preferred measure, excludes assets
whose returns may be untaxed in the short run or
tax-deferred. We chose to exclude business assets
as we believe that, although households may borrow
against their house to finance their business inter-
ests, it is unlikely that they would sell their business
interests to reduce their outstanding mortgage in the
absence of mortgage interest deductibility. Similarly,
TABLE 3
Balance Sheet: Preferred and Inclusive Measures
Assets Liabilities
Financial Assets Mortgage Debt
 Liquid assets Principal residence
 CDS Second residence
 Taxable NMMF
 Tax-exempt NMMF
 Stocks
 Taxable bonds
 Tax-exempt bonds
Retirement assets (including
tax-deferred equity and bonds)
 Other financial assets
Non-Financial Assets Other Debt
Vehicles  Other lines of credit
House(s)  Loans
 Business (net worth)  Other debt
 Other residential assets
 Net non-residential equity
 Other (net) non-financial assets Net worth
Note:  indicates assets included for the preferred measure while in addition to  the inclusive measure includes
assets (minus liabilities) indicated by .
Source: Authors’ compilation.
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we excluded liquid assets as these assets may serve
purposes other than generating interest income.
Our third and last definition of interest-bearing
assets only consists of non-liquid, taxable financial
assets. Relative to our preferred measure, this
measure removes non-financial assets from the set
of assets with taxable revenues. We consider this to
be a fairly conservative measure of interest-bearing
assets that could be used to lower mortgage debt,
and so will its corresponding revenue loss measure.
Table 4 reports our estimates of government rev-
enue losses from mortgage interest deductibility for
each measure. Depending on the definition of interest-
bearing assets, the revenue loss for the government is
between $18.15 billion and $32.91 billion, that is, be-
tween 36 percent and 66 percent of the conventionally
measured revenue loss. Even relative to our conserva-
tive measure, the conventional measure greatly
overstates the revenue loss from this program. Table 4
also presents the percentage increase in tax revenues
the government should expect following the elimina-
tion of mortgage interest deductibility. According to
our preferred measure, federal tax revenues would in-
crease by about 3.3 percent which, although
substantial, is more than two percentage points below
the conventional estimate.
The last two rows of Table 4 report the loan-to-
value (LTV) ratios and mortgage debt-to-GDP ratios
that obtain following the removal of mortgage in-
terest deductibility under the four measures. The
actual LTV ratio for 1997, which obtains under the
conventional measure, was just above 40 percent.
Under our preferred measure, the LTV ratio is around
30 percent. It is interesting to note that the LTV ratio
in Canada, where mortgage interest is not deductible,
was around 27.5 percent in 1999.23  Similarly, mort-
gage debt-to-GDP in Canada in 1999 was between 30.7
percent (for mortgage debt on principal residences) and
35.5 percent (for total mortgage debt), which is close
to the 30.45 percent we obtain under our preferred
measure. We will present more evidence from Cana-
dian data in the fifth section.
Implied Elasticity of Mortgage Demand
Each measure we propose in the previous section
implicitly defines a price elasticity of the demand
for mortgage debt. First, removing mortgage inter-
est deductibility implies an increase in the price of
mortgage debt for a household from i × −( )1 τ  to i.
Second, each of our three measures implies a change
in mortgage debt for each household following the
removal of the tax provision. We can thus use the
change in mortgage demand and the change in its
price to estimate the elasticity of mortgage demand
implied by each of our measures using the follow-
ing regression:
l ( ) l ( ) (l ( )
l ( ( )))
n M n M n i
n i
adj
k k
k k
− = +
− × − +
α β
τ ε1 ,
TABLE 4
Revenue Loss from Mortgage Interest Deductibility
Conventional Conservative Preferred Inclusive
Cost of MID ($ billion) 50.03 32.91 29.18 18.15
Relative federal tax (%) 5.71 3.76 3.33 2.07
Relative total tax (%) 4.82 3.71 2.81 1.75
Loan-to-value ratio (%) 40.28 31.84 29.94 21.69
Mortgage debt-to-GDP ratio (%) 46.81 33.32 30.45 20.51
Source: Authors’ compilation.
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where for a household k, M is the original mortgage
outstanding, M adj  is the mortgage outstanding for
one of the three measures after the removal of mort-
gage interest deductibility and ε is an i.i.d. error
term. The left-hand side of the regression equation
is the change in the logarithm of mortgage outstand-
ing while the right-hand side is the change in the
logarithm of the price of mortgage debt. The esti-
mate of β from the regression measures the elasticity
of mortgage demand with respect to its price.
The implied price elasticities of mortgage de-
mand are –0.54, –0.70 and –1.42 for the
conservative, preferred, and inclusive measures,
respectively. Since the inclusive measure allows for
more assets to be used to offset mortgage debt than
the conservative measure, the price elasticity implied
by the former is naturally higher than for the latter.
It is interesting to note that Dunsky and Follain
(2000), using the 1986 US tax reform, estimate the
elasticity of mortgage demand to be about –1.13,
which is in the range of the elasticities implied by
our measures of assets that would be used to lower
mortgage debt following the removal of mortgage
interest deductibility.
DISTRIBUTIONAL EFFECTS OF MID
In this section we study how government revenue
losses from mortgage interest deductibility are distrib-
uted. We show that although the benefits from MID
are increasing in income for our preferred measure,
they do not increase as fast as tax liabilities. Accord-
ingly, we argue that mortgage interest deductibility
does not decrease the degree of progressivity of the
tax code, contradicting the conventional wisdom that
this program is highly regressive.
Figure 3 depicts the benefits from mortgage in-
terest deductibility across the income (AGI)
distribution for our four measures.24  While all
FIGURE 3
Distribution of Benefits of MID by Income
Source: Authors’ calculations using US SCF 1998 data.
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measures of the benefits increase with income, the
increase is much less pronounced according to our
preferred measure than the conventional one. The
average benefit for households with income above
$200,000 is more than 30 times the average benefit
for households with income between $30,000 and
$40,000 using the conventional measure. For our pre-
ferred and inclusive measures respectively, this number
is 14 and 6 times the average benefit for households
with income between $30,000 and $40,000.
An interesting and recurring question in the lit-
erature is whether mortgage interest deductibility
increases or decreases the degree of progressivity
of the US tax code. Figure 4 plots the benefits of
MID relative to taxes paid across the income distri-
bution.25  This figure shows that for all but the
conventional measure, while the benefits from MID
increase with income, they do not increase as fast
as federal taxes paid for income above $50,000. In
other words, mortgage interest deductibility makes
the tax code less progressive at relatively low levels
of income, and more progressive for relatively high
levels of income. It is interesting to note that even
for the conventional measure; mortgage interest
deductibility does not make the tax system less pro-
gressive at all income levels.
One would also expect new homeowners to care
more about mortgage interest deductibility than house-
holds who have long been homeowners. Figure 5 plots
the home-ownership rate by age, as well as the frac-
tion of households with mortgage debt. The home-
ownership rate increases rapidly until age 40, after
which it remains stable around 75 to 80 percent. While
the fraction of households with positive mortgage debt
FIGURE 4
Distribution of Benefits of MID Relative to Federal Taxes Paid
Source: Authors’ calculations using US SCF 1998 data.
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increases more or less at the same rate as the home-
ownership rate, this fraction declines steadily after age
40 to 44. This seems to suggest that younger and po-
tentially new homeowners rely more heavily on
mortgage debt than their older counterparts. To exam-
ine the extent to which mortgage interest deductibility
matters for new homeowners, Figure 6 depicts the ben-
efits from mortgage interest deductibility for
homeowners of different ages. This figure clearly
shows that the conventional measure misses the im-
portance of mortgage interest deductibility for new
home buyers. By contrast, all three of our measures
indicate that MID benefits increase as the home-
ownership rate increases and declines thereafter. Our
measures thus suggest that new home buyers, who rely
heavily on mortgage debt to finance their first house,
care much more about mortgage interest deductibility
than older homeowners, a pattern that does not emerge
from the conventional measure.
EVIDENCE FROM CANADIAN DATA
As we alluded to earlier, mortgage interest payments
are not deductible in Canada. Although there are
many differences between the Canadian and the
American tax systems, we can nevertheless use Ca-
nadian data to gain confidence in our measures of
the cost and distributional effects of removing mort-
gage interest deductibility.26  We do so by using the
1999 Canadian Survey of Financial Securities (SFS),
which contains data similar to that found in the SCF
for the United States.
To begin, the home-ownership rate in Canada has
been comparable to that of the US in recent years.
For example, the home-ownership rate in Canada
went from 63.6 percent in 1996 to 65.8 percent in
2001, while it increased from 65.4 percent to 67.8
percent during the same period in the US.27  The
FIGURE 5
Home Ownership and Mortgage Incidence by Age
Source: Authors’ calculations using US SCF 1998 data.
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home-ownership rate in the SFS, however, is only
60.4 percent. Meanwhile, the incidence of mortgage
debt in the SFS is 32.7 percent, that is, a little over
half (54.1 percent) of homeowners in the Survey
have outstanding mortgage debts. In the SCF, where
the home-ownership rate is 66.3 percent, the inci-
dence of mortgage debt is 43.5 percent, that is, 65.6
percent of homeowners in the Survey have outstand-
ing mortgage debt. Figure 7 depicts the Canadian
home-ownership rate and mortgage incidence by
income—the Canadian counterpart of Figure 1 for
the US.28  Notice that while the home-ownership rate
in Canada is much lower than in the US at low lev-
els of income, they are very similar at higher levels
of income. In contrast to the US, however, mort-
gage incidence displays a hump in Canada. This
figure thus shows that high earners in Canada are
much less likely to have outstanding mortgage debt
than their US counterparts.29
Figure 8, according to our measures, depicts the
fraction of households by income with outstanding
mortgage debt that would result if mortgage inter-
est deductibility were removed from the US tax
code. The figure shows that for all three measures
the fraction of households with mortgage debt peaks
and then declines and looks remarkably similar to
that obtained from Canadian data (Figure 7).
Table 5 provides further evidence that unlike
homeowners in the US, Canadian homeowners tend
to pay off their mortgage before accumulating non-
residential assets. For each age group, the numbers
in this table represent the mean amount of non-
residential assets held by homeowners with a
mortgage relative to the amount of non-residential
assets held by homeowners without a mortgage.30
A value of one thus means that homeowners with
and without mortgage debt tend to hold the same
FIGURE 6
Distribution of Benefits of MID by Age for Homeowners
Source: Authors’ calculations using US SCF 1998 data.
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FIGURE 7
Home Ownership and Mortgage Incidence by Income for Canada
FIGURE 8
Mortgage Incidence by Income after Reshuffling
Source: Authors’ calculations using Canadian SFS 1999 data.
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amount of non-residential assets. A value above one,
as is the case for all age groups in the US, means that
homeowners with a mortgage tend to own more non-
residential assets than those who own their house
outright. Finally, a value below one, as is the case for
Canadian households above 40 years of age, means
that homeowners with 100 percent equity in their house
tend to have more non-residential assets than home-
owners with outstanding mortgage debt. The last three
columns of Table 5 suggest that these ratios for US
homeowners would become much closer to those of
their Canadian counterparts should mortgage interest
deductibility be removed from the US tax code.
CONCLUSION
This paper argues that the conventional way of
measuring the cost, in terms of government revenue
losses, of allowing mortgage interest deductibility
is highly overstated in the literature. The reason is
simple: households would reshuffle their balance
sheet if mortgage interest deductibility were abol-
ished. Since the conventional measure assumes that
individual behaviour would not change after the
elimination of tax expenditures, it greatly overstates
the cost of this program.
We compute three alternative measures of the cost
of mortgage interest deductibility. Each measure
computes the amount of assets that households
would use to buy out mortgage debt if MID were
abolished. These measures differ as to the kind of
assets households would use for this purpose. We
find that the cost of MID is between 36 percent and
66 percent of the conventional measure.
We also characterize the distributional impact of
MID. According to our preferred measure, the ben-
efits of MID do not increase with wealth for wealth
levels above the median. We also argue that while
the benefits of MID increase with income, they do
not increase as fast as taxes paid. Accordingly, we
conclude that mortgage interest deductibility makes
the tax code less progressive at relatively low levels
of income and more progressive for relatively high
levels of income. Finally, we show that mortgage
interest deductibility is particularly important for
new home buyers, a pattern that does not emerge
under the conventional measure.
TABLE 5
Mean Non-Residential Assets for Homeowners with a Mortgage Relative to those Without
Age Canada US Conservative Preferred Inclusive
25–29 2.38 2.91 0.64 0.64 0.47
30–34 1.46 1.73 0.73 0.70 0.58
35–39 1.25 2.71 1.22 1.17 0.87
40–44 0.82 3.95 0.66 0.64 0.49
45–49 0.83 1.82 0.56 0.53 0.41
50–54 0.69 2.03 0.66 0.61 0.52
55–59 0.81 1.37 0.51 0.47 0.42
60–64 0.80 1.18 0.32 0.30 0.26
65+ 0.82 1.94 0.68 0.63 0.59
Source: Authors’ compilation.
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The misconceptions that are at the heart of our
analysis plagued Ontario’s newspapers during the
2003 provincial election. Ernie Eves’ proposal to
phase in mortgage interest deductibility was per-
ceived by the press as an expensive program that
would provide a tremendous tax relief for the rich
and not much for the middle-class. To quote an edi-
torial from the Toronto Star: “A young family with
a modest income and a 7 percent, $150,000 mort-
gage, for example, would save about $465 a year in
taxes when the scheme was fully in place. But a mil-
lionaire, with a $1.5 million mortgage on a monster
home in one of Toronto’s toniest neighbourhoods,
would see his taxes go down by close to $6,000”
(Toronto Star, 11 April 2003). Although our results
suggest that such statements most likely overstate
the cost and distributional effects this program
would have in Canada, more precise estimates would
have to take into account the fact that Canadians
tend to save more in tax-sheltered form than do
Americans (see Milligan 2005), which could miti-
gate the balance sheet reshuffling effect that we
emphasize.
This type of analysis is, of course, subject to some
caveats. Although the US Survey of Consumer Fi-
nances offers high-quality data on assets and
liabilities, it contains virtually no information about
their characteristics. In particular, we have no in-
formation on the return or the risk of any of the
components of households’ portfolio. In an attempt
to circumvent this issue, we consider several meas-
ures of assets that households would use to lower
their outstanding mortgage debt following the elimi-
nation of mortgage interest deductibility. However,
this leaves open the possibility that households may
use mortgage debt to diversify their portfolio (see
Berkovec and Fullerton 1992). A second caveat is
that our analysis does not allow us to make any nor-
mative statements with respect to this program. To
do so would require a fully specified dynamic model
of individual behaviour with an explicit tenure
choice, which we leave for future research.
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1 In the United States, mortgage interest deductibility
allows taxpayers to deduct qualified interest paid on up
to $1 million in acquisition debt secured by the taxpayer’s
principal residence and one other residence. Taxpayers
may also deduct interest on up to $100,000 in home equity
debt. The total of the acquisition and home equity debt
on which the deduction is taken cannot exceed the fair
market value of the home. See http://www.irs.gov/
publications/p936/ar02.html\#d0e175 for a detailed ex-
planation of what qualifies as a mortgage interest
deduction.
2 For a detailed discussion of the issue refer to http://
www.pmabrethour.com/message/message23.html and
http://www.theglobeandmail.com/series/election2k3/
news/analysis11.html.
3 Itemization refers to deduction from a taxpayer’s tax-
able adjusted gross income that is made up of deductions
for money spent on certain goods and services through-
out the year. The specific deductions that are allowed are
outlined by the IRS and include such expenses as mort-
gage interest, state and local taxes, gifts, and medical
expenses. As an alternative to standard deduction, an item-
ized deduction requires taxpayers to keep track of each
possible tax-reducing expense throughout the year.
4 Skinner and Feenberg (1990) and Maki (1996, 2001)
make a similar argument in a different context. Follow-
ing the 1986 tax reform, which eliminated deductibility
of interest paid on consumer debt, households reshuffled
their balance sheet by increasing their mortgage debt to
pay off their consumer debt.
5 Similar results can be found in Hendershott, Pryce
and White (2003), who study the change in loan-to-value
CPPv34n4p1 3/13/08, 12:38 PM17
18 Martin Gervais and Manish Pandey
CANADIAN PUBLIC POLICY – ANALYSE DE POLITIQUES, VOL. XXXIV, NO. 1 2008
ratio of housing purchases following the phasing out of
MID in the United Kingdom.
6 The income data contained in the SCF are sufficiently
detailed to compute each household’s tax liability using
NBER’s TaxSim model. See Feenberg and Coutts (1993)
for information on the TaxSim model.
7 We use the 1998 SCF because it is the most recent wave
of the Survey which has some geographical information.
8 Convincing evidence that such a reshuffling occurs
when mortgage interest deductibility is removed can be
found in Alan and Leth-Petersen (2006) who investigate
the responsiveness of household portfolios to changes in
the tax provision for Denmark.
9 Given the nature of our analysis, another caveat of
this paper is that no normative statements can be made
based on changes in allocations; for example, changes in
housing size, following the removal of mortgage interest
deductibility.
10 Indeed, Maki (2001) writes that because Congress
“determined that encouraging home ownership is an im-
portant policy goal, achieved in part by providing a
deduction for residential mortgage interest,” it chose to
retain the residential mortgage interest deduction (Joint
Committee on Taxation 1987, 263-64) while it eliminated
interest deduction on all other consumer loans.
11 In fact, the Bush administration’s 2002 budget stated
that “the Administration believes the meaningfulness of
tax expenditure estimates is uncertain” (Office of Manage-
ment and Budget 2002) and promised a new more
meaningful presentation in future years.
12 Gervais (2002) argues that this tax advantage is far
more important than mortgage interest deductibility to
explain households’ tenure decision. Ling and McGill
(1993) argue that the failure to tax imputed rents involves
much more revenue losses for the government than al-
lowing mortgage interest deductibility.
13 This is a conservative assumption, in the sense that
assuming a (positive) wedge between the lending and
borrowing interest rates would only serve to lower our
measures of the cost of mortgage interest deductibility.
14 See Appendix II for details on how we compute tax
rates. See Feenberg and Coutts (1993) for details about
the TaxSim model.
15 The US tax code implies that a household should
itemize its deductions if total itemized deductions are
greater than the standard deduction allowed for the house-
hold. Standard deductions depend on the tax filing status
of households. For the tax year 1997 standard deductions
were as follows: Single household $4,150; married filing
jointly $6,900; head of household $6,050. We assume that
all married households file taxes jointly.
16 Without depreciation, imputed rents correspond to
the value of housing services, so these terms cancel out
for homeowners.
17 We also omit timing issues that arise in cases such
as capital gains, which are taxed only when realized.
18 Unfortunately, the SCF does not report households’
state of residence, which is important for US tax calcula-
tions in general, but especially crucial for mortgage
interest deductibility calculations. To circumvent this
problem, we use the 1998 version of the SCF, which is
the most recent wave of the Survey for which households
reported their census region. We use this information to
compute tax liabilities and tax rates for each state in which
a household could reside. We then use a population
weighted average to get our estimates of each household’s
tax liability and tax rate. See Appendix I for details.
19 The SCF is sufficiently detailed for us to compute
outstanding mortgages for each household as the sum of
the remaining mortgage on the principal residence and
one other residence, as specified by the tax law (see note
1). For households with more than two residences, the
second residence is the one with the highest mortgage
interest payment.
20 As emphasized in the Introduction, the IRS does have
information on the revenue (flow data) generated by each
component of taxpayers’ balance sheet—each taxpayer
needs to report (i b)k and (i a)k, which could be used to
implement our calculation through a flow approach.
21 For practical purposes, the cost for each household k
is given by C Ck k k* = + ∆ , where ∆k k ki b= × ×τ ( )
if a bk k≥  or ∆k k ki a= × ×τ  if a bk k< . In other
words, we use the household-specific mortgage interest
rate as it is available in the SCF, but use the common
interest rate i for asset income as this interest rate is not
available in the data.
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22 Engen and Gale (1997) show that the rise in 401(k)
assets among homeowners was associated with a rise in
mortgage borrowing. Accordingly, they argue that the
increase in mortgage credit could have emanated from
the increased availability of tax-sheltered savings plans
rather than the loss of interest deductibility on consumer
loans.
23 This number is computed from the Canadian Sur-
vey of Financial Security.
24 Benefits from mortgage interest deductibility across
the wealth (net worth) distribution for our four measures
show that for the conventional measure, benefits from
MID increase exponentially with wealth. However, for
our preferred measure benefits only increase in wealth
for relatively poor households while for our inclusive
measure the benefits are decreasing in wealth for house-
holds above median wealth.
25 Households with income between $10,000 and
$20,000 are mainly retired individuals. For the working
age population, households in this income range pay nega-
tive taxes on average, just like households with income
below $10,000, for whom we set the relative benefit to
zero in Figure 4.
26 It is important to note that there are, of course, many
other differences between the Canadian and US tax treat-
ment of income from various assets, which also affect
the portfolio decisions of Canadian and American house-
holds. Of particular interest is the fact that the fraction of
wealth held by Canadians in tax-differed assets is much
larger than that of US households. See Milligan (2005)
and Poterba and Samwick (2002) for details on Canadian
and American household asset allocations, respectively.
27 Home-ownership rates for Canada are from Census
data.
28 We use the real exchange rate from Penn World Ta-
ble 6.1 to convert income and wealth from the SFS into
US dollars, and the CPI to deflate them back to 1997.
29 This hump-shaped pattern of mortgage incidence in
Canada (not shown) is even more pronounced with re-
spect to wealth.
30 For each household, non-residential asset holdings
are defined as total assets minus the value of their princi-
pal residence, the value of their vehicles, and the value
of retirement assets. This definition thus corresponds to
our definition of interest-bearing assets for the inclusive
measure introduced in the third section.
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APPENDIX I
SCF DATA AND DEFINITION OF WEALTH
The data for household wealth and income used in this paper are from the 1998 Survey of Consumer Fi-
nances (SCF). The SCF is a triennial survey of households sponsored by the Federal Reserve Board. The
survey collects information on assets, liabilities, income, employment, demographics and relationship with
financial institutions, and contains information for 4,305 households.1
Information on the state of residence of households is crucial for tax computations since income tax rates
differ across states and state income taxes are deductible at the federal level. For confidentiality reasons,
unfortunately, the state of residence is not available in the public dataset. However, the 1998 SCF dataset
provides the census region of residence of the household. Census regions are based on a geographic division
of the country into nine regions with each census region consisting of between three and nine states. Using
the census regions we overcome the lack of information about the state of residence by computing income
taxes for a household in a region for each of the states in the region and then taking a population weighted
average over the states to get the tax liability of the household.
The definition of wealth used in this paper corresponds to net worth, defined as the difference between
assets and liabilities for a household. The wealth concept used is referred to as marketable wealth and is the
same as that used by Kennickell, Starr-McCluer and Surette (2000) and Budría Rodríguez et al. (2002).2
Assets
Financial Assets
1. Liquid assets: checking accounts, savings accounts, money market mutual funds and call accounts with
brokers
2. CDS: certificates of deposit
3. Taxable NMMF: taxable non-money market mutual funds
4. Tax-exempt NMMF: non-taxable non-money market mutual funds
5. Stocks
6. Taxable bonds
7. Tax-exempt bonds
8. Retirement assets: IRAs, thrift-type accounts and future pensions and includes tax-deferred equity and
tax-deferred bonds
9. Other financial assets: cash value of whole life insurance, other managed assets (trusts, annuities, and
managed investment accounts) and loans, future proceeds, royalties, futures, non-public stock, deferred
compensation, oil/gas/mineral invest., cash n.e.c.
1 As suggested by the SCF 1998 code book, a weighted average of the “implicates” is used for the computations that
follow with the weight associated with each implicate divided by five. See the code book for the 1998 SCF for details.
2 The code we use for wealth computation is available at http://www.federalreserve.gov/pubs/oss/oss2/95/
codebk95pt5.html.
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Non-Financial Assets
1. Vehicles: autos, motor homes, RVs, airplanes, boats
2. House(s): primary and secondary residence
3. Other residential real estate
4. Business (net worth): value of net equity if business were sold today
5. Net equity in non-residential real estate
6. Other (net) non-financial assets
Debt
Mortgage Debt
1. Mortgage debt: mortgage, home equity loans and HELOCs on primary and secondary residence
Other Debt
1. Other lines of credit
2. Loans: credit card debt and installment loans
3. Other debt: loans for pensions, loans for life insurance, margin loans, miscellaneous
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3 The code to compute the information required by TaxSim from SCF data was provided by Kevin Moore from the
Federal Reserve Board.
APPENDIX II
TAX COMPUTATION
TaxSim version 5.1 provided by the NBER is used to compute income taxes for each household in the SCF
dataset for the 1997 tax year.3  Income taxes are computed under the following assumptions: (a) the filing
unit is the household; (b) all cohabitating and married couples file jointly; and (c) itemization status is
determined by TaxSim and not by a direct question in the SCF. A household from a census region is given
states codes for all states in the region. This provides between three and nine different sets of data for each
household depending on the region of residence. The data are then uploaded to TaxSim to compute the
adjusted gross income (AGI), tax liability, and marginal tax rate for each household in the dataset and for
each state of the region of residence. Doing so, we compute tax liabilities and marginal tax rates for each
state in which the household may reside. Each household’s tax liability and marginal tax rate are then
computed as the weighted average over all states in the region, where the weights are taken to be population
weights from census data.
CPPv34n4p1 3/13/08, 12:39 PM23
